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offering an image of human independence that is unavailable under the regime of biological
evolution. By conducting comparative readings of Michel Houellebecq’s The Possibility of an
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instigated by the critical apparatus developed with my reading of Deleuze, I establish the existence
of a genealogy of post-Darwinian narratives in which the island facilitates a specifically utopian
dream of individual autonomy, which is bound up with the ideology of capitalism. Taken
together, I argue, these works emphasise the importance and complex position of the island in
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such utopian, capitalist fantasies of human sovereignty nor deterministic pessimism, but explore
critically these ideas as they co-exist in tension.
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Trees and islands: models of evolution and criticism
“We are all post-Darwinians.” So says Virginia Richter (2011, p. 1) in her recent work on the
influence exerted by Charles Darwin’s theories of evolution on Western literature and, specifically,
on how literary art negotiates the distinction humanity seeks to make between itself and animality.
However, Darwin’s contemporaries, Richter (2011, p. 7) writes, “recoiled from the theory of
natural selection”―not because of scientific objections, but primarily “because man’s singular
status as a superior being […] was fundamentally called into question.” In turn, related “fears of
degeneration, of individual reversions to a more primitive or even animal level, and of the large
scale of breakdown of civilization” have become immanent to Western society’s collective
post-Darwinian unconscious. This assertion of the epochal nature of Darwin’s thought is as much
a historical and psychical argument as it is an announcement of a particular literary critical approach
which responds to the culturally monumental paradigm shift induced by Darwin’s work.
As Gillian Beer (2009, p. 3) puts it in her influential work, Darwin’s Plots, once Darwin’s
theory of natural selection became popularised, “everyone found themselves living in a Darwinian
world in which old assumptions had ceased to be assumptions, could be at best beliefs, or myths,
or, at worst, detritus of the past.” Just as Freudian psychoanalysis and its concepts slipped into
common usage, “disrupt[ing] all possible past patterns for apprehending experience,” Darwin’s
theories of evolution―natural selection, in particular―represent transformative events in human
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thought, whose impact on Western culture and literature in particular is indelible (Beer, 2009,
p. 3). Thus, for Beer and Richter both, reading any ‘post-Darwinian’ work of literature in relation
to the conceptual and literary content of Darwin’s evolutionary thought, regardless of its direct
historical or genealogical connection to Darwinism, is not only critically admissible,
methodologically speaking, it is, by implication, an intellectual necessity. All literary art after the
emergence of The Origin of Species in 1859 is, implicitly, already either written or understood in
relation to a collective cultural unconscious shaped by Darwinian evolutionary theory.
Beer and Richter confirm the episteme-defining significance of Darwin’s thought and,
tacitly, the value of excavating through creative readings of diverse and unexpected texts this
episteme’s unconscious assumptions, beliefs, and myths. However, Beer in Darwin’s Plots and
numerous other critics study solely works of Victorian literature on the basis that they are
demonstrably or consciously written in response to Darwin’s work (Beer, 2009; Levine, 1988;
Shuttleworth, 1984). For Beer (2009, p. 4), this approach springs from a desire to examine and
to take into account the specific “act of reading” Darwin and the reaction that act precipitated in
works by authors such as Thomas Hardy and George Eliot.
I shall in this paper be taking a different route. Rather than make use, as Beer does, of the
critical possibilities of conscious discursive connection, tracing a legible narrative of historical
continuity through a literary genealogy of readers and responders, I focus here on a topos which
represents radical disconnection: the island. Darwin (1859, p. 489) enjoins us at the conclusion
of The Origin of Species to “contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants of many
kinds, with birds singing on the bushes […] and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms,
so different from each other, and dependent on each other in so complex a manner.” Such
interconnection, Darwin argues, is the basis for the transformations of evolution which act
according to laws of inheritance, variation, competition, and reproduction. Beer’s broadly
historicist undertaking can be understood, in one sense, as a mirror of Darwin’s genealogical one:
an attempt to understand simultaneously mechanisms of connection and transformation. And
there is a similar sense of entanglement and complexity in the network of interpenetrations and
relations of mutual transformation among Darwin’s work, the writing of his literary
contemporaries, and Victorian culture and discourse more broadly (Glendenning, 2007).
However, the methodology I seek to employ endeavours to make use of an apparently antithetical
image, to focus on the representation in literary art of a nominally ahistorical abstraction, the
figure of the island, a notionally sovereign topos, isolated, shorn of connection. In doing so I
hope to offer a new point of origin from which to continue to excavate the post-Darwinian
unconscious, revealing submerged conceptual relations between apparently disconnected texts
and new genealogies of post-Darwinian literature.
My focus on the figure of the island here, understood as an object in opposition to that of
the genealogical line or tree, is not solely a methodological conceit. The island is a significant
topos―both in the sense of a recurrent theme and imagined place―in the post-Darwinian gestalt.
The island, I shall show, is an embodiment of a type of imagined biological independence which
is no longer available to humanity after Darwin. This, too, is Richter’s (2011, p. 8) thesis when
she in After Darwin focuses her literary critical explorations on what she calls the literary and
philosophical impact of the “anthropocentric anxieties” generated by Darwin’s thought. The
Origin of Species does not seek explicitly to demonstrate the troubling thesis that the human is
biologically united with and derived from the animal. But in Darwin’s later work, The Descent of
Man, which explores humanity’s indissociable biological and historical connection with all other
biological life, this argument is made unavoidable (Darwin, 1859, 1871). “It is only our natural
prejudice, and that arrogance which made our forefathers declare that they were descended from
demi-gods,” writes Darwin in the latter text, “but the time will before long come when it will
be thought wonderful, that naturalists, who were well acquainted with the comparative structure
and development of man and other mammals, should have believed that each was the work of a
separate act of creation” (Darwin, 1871, pp. 33-34). Thus, the post-Darwinian world is one in
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which the ontological and bodily sovereignty of the human is constantly under question and in
which the very category of humanity, through its connection with animal life, is immanently
under threat.
In her reading of H.G. Wells’ The Island of Dr. Moreau (2005 [1896]) via Giorgio Agamben’s
(1998) concept of ‘bare life’, Richter (2011) recognizes in the novel’s eugenically synthesized
hybrid animals a kind of uncanny, abject evolutionary horror. Half-man and half-beast, these
beings are liminal and transgressive, a kind of life which, according to Agamben (1998, p. 109),
is “not simply natural reproductive life, the zoē of the Greeks, nor bios, a qualified form of life,”
but is “the bare life of homo sacer and the wargus, a zone of indistinction and continuous transition
between man and beast, nature and culture.” Such a type of living being, Richter suggests, is an
embodiment of the horror humanity faces as it confronts its own evolutionary origins and, since
humanity can be understood as distinct only in opposition to animality, its own death in the wake
of Darwin’s deconstruction of the notion of independent creation. Furthermore, for Richter
(2011, p. 100), Moreau’s ‘Beast-folk’ represent a double kind of ‘forgery’. The novel’s narrator,
Prendick, is a potentially unreliable witness, whose story of the vivisectionist Moreau and his
eugenically created half-animal, half-human monstrosities, is considered by others to be highly
suspicious (Wells, 2005 [1896]). Thus, insofar as the veracity of Prendick’s account of the island
of Dr. Moreau and the human-beasts which inhabit it is unverifiable, it is significant that the
beasts themselves are a kind of biological creation without essential grounding: the ‘Beast-folk’
are a form of biological counterfeit, an unreal creation, just as for humanity after Darwin any
sense of distinctiveness must itself be a kind of fiction.
The semantic undecidability of the forgery―an uncertainty mirrored by the hybrid,
uncanny nature of Moreau’s monsters―is only made possible in the novel by the topographical
conditions of the island’s geographical isolation and its radical disconnection from the world.
Moreau escapes to this island in order to conduct his vivisectional experiments in isolation and
without interruption, and Prendick finds himself on this unmapped island purely by accident,
after he is shipwrecked. Further emphasising the radical isolation of this island, Prendick’s rescue
occurs only when a boat floats serendipitously ashore to the island, on which he escapes to be
picked up by another ship. But even when the island is located, Moreau’s beasts are never found
and it is for this reason that Prendick’s story cannot be verified; a ship visiting the island finds it
uninhabited apart from a number of curious, but wholly recognizable, species of rats, hogs, and
other mammals. Thus the island first appears as geographically other, as existing outside human
understanding and, subsequent to its discovery, potentially fictitious. The isolated and then
deserted island of Dr. Moreau, therefore, is itself a kind of liminal case like the ‘Beast-folk’, a
paradox in the light of the interconnected historico-biological materialism of evolutionary theory.
For it remains radically apart from and resistant to the genealogical project of evolution, which
suggests universal material entanglement as a mode of understanding. At the same time, it is
precisely this isolation―which is either fictitious or real―which facilitates the creation of an
interstitial and fluid type of biological life that is itself resistant to taxonomical capture or simplistic
notions of individual species.
Deleuze’s island and evolutionary individualism
In The Island of Dr. Moreau the deserted island can be read as representative, on the one hand, of a
radical discontinuity which, on the other, supports a type of life and meaning which by virtue of
the continuity between human and animal life is resistant to representational fixity. This tension is
explored further by Gilles Deleuze (2004) in his early, enigmatic essay, ‘Desert Islands’, which
explores the contradiction in geographically materialist and imaginary mythical conceptions of desert
islands. A rudimental understanding of island geology, Deleuze argues, shows how islands are
geographical exemplars of the liminal, fluid kind of life which Wells’ ‘Beast-folk’ embody from
a biological perspective. ‘Continental islands’, Deleuze (2004, p. 9) points out, are borne of
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derivation and disarticulation while ‘oceanic islands’ emerge from “underwater eruptions” and
coral reefs, “bringing to the light of day a movement from the lowest depths”: both remind us that
“the sea is on top of the earth, taking advantage of the slightest sagging in the highest structure [and]
that the earth is still there, under the sea, gathering its strength to punch through to the surface.”
Islands, therefore, despite appearances, are never either separate or deserted, but are continuous
with and penetrated by the earthly materiality of geological duration, by humanly indiscernible
processes of differentiation, emergence, and derivation. They are constituted by the constant
interchange between earth and water and in this way embody a differential, unstable ontology.
Just as the ‘wargus’ is a horrifying image of transgressive biological indistinction, Deleuze
(2004, p. 9) observes that humanity finds no reassurance in this conception of the instability and
differential materiality of islands, and seeks where possible to repress this fact. To that end, he
posits that the popular imaginary figure of the remote and disconnected deserted island is symbolic
of a fantasy that ‘the active struggle between the earth and water is over, or at least contained’,
and that, therefore, there exists a space of total stability and emptiness which is amenable to stable
(representational) capture. This notion is developed further in his reading of the topos of the
desert island in Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, which asserts that here the imaginary figure of
the deserted island functions not only to make possible an anti-materialist, transcendentally
grounded conception of the life, but sustains a semi-divine notion of individual agency.
“Dreaming of islands,” Deleuze (2004, p. 10) writes, is both “dreaming of pulling away, of being
already separate, far from any continent” as well as “dreaming of starting from scratch.” Crusoe’s
desert island, like that of Dr. Moreau, is an ideational petri dish, its separation and isolation making
possible the growth of a culture, understood as biological life in the latter and human civilization
in the former. But in contrast with Richter’s and my reading of Dr. Moreau’s island laboratory,
which produces monstrous semantic or biological diffuseness, Crusoe’s island represents a fantasy
of reconstituting a world of religious security, certitude, and individualism: the world as the
everyday life of protestant, bourgeois, Western civilization (Deleuze, 2004, p. 12). Viewing the
desert island as “already separate,” as a geographically, economically, historically autonomous
terrus nullus, allows Defoe to cast Crusoe’s island as an indivisible and autarchic point of origination
on which capitalist society and logic can be spontaneously re-generated by the work and effort
of Crusoe himself. Thus, Deleuze’s reading suggests, the imaginative topos of the deserted island
provides the conditions for an unexamined (or, perhaps, disingenuous) transcendental monadism,
which itself philosophically underwrites the individualism of Defoe’s and Crusoe’s shared ideology.
This reading of Defoe’s novel is echoed in Ian Watt’s analysis of Robinson Crusoe and the
genesis and evolution of the novel form in Europe (Watt, 1957). Watt demonstrates how the
fantasy of the transcendent creative agency of the homo economicus in Defoe’s novel both nourishes
and is nourished by the historical emergence of a Puritan, individualist impulse in the late-17th
and early 18th centuries. Crusoe, Watt argues, can be read as an archetypal capitalist, whose
conception of sovereignty and self-sufficient individualism develops that of the British empiricists
of the 17th century, and whose construction of a civilized world from a savage one dignifies
Adam Smith’s focus on the division of labour in The Wealth of Nations later in the century.
Between Deleuze and Watt, then, the literary figure of the desert island takes on a specific form
and performs a specific type of work. A notionally transcendent and autonomous monad becomes
the setting on which to stage the supreme inventive power of capitalism, while this imagined
desert island also becomes a topographical projection, deeply ingrained in Western culture, of
the isolated and atomized but autonomous and empowered capitalist subject.
Deleuze criticizes Robinson Crusoe as a tedious fantasy of the desire of the capitalist
bourgeoisie, and laments its continuing popularity in contemporary children’s curricula; but he
does not dismiss the novel outright. Instead, he elaborates how the novel―like The Island of Dr.
Moreau―deflates its own fantasy of ex nihilo creativity which powers Crusoe’s belief in his own
individual autonomy. While indistinct ontological status of the ‘Beast-folk’ repudiate any simplistic
conception of the island as transcendent isolate in Wells’ text, Deleuze shows how Robinson Crusoe
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contains a disavowed historically and economically materialist conception of life in its account
of Crusoe’s re-creation of civilization. The resources with which Crusoe builds his lodgings and
his new life are not generated spontaneously from the island itself; they are instead derived and
re-made as valuable from already extant materials. “Everything is taken from the ship. Nothing
is invented. It is all painstakingly applied on the island. Time is nothing but the time necessary
for capital to produce a benefit as the outcome of work. And the providential function of God
is to guarantee a return” (Deleuze, 2004, p. 12). This theological Marxist retelling of Crusoe’s
resourcefulness―the creation of surplus value through labour―illustrates how the narrative of
the novel undoes the ideological dream it is meant to sustain. However, Deleuze’s endeavour in
this essay does not terminate with an abstract diagnosis of the Western imaginary’s neurotic
attachment to and espousal of individualist, capitalist idealism or, indeed, with a deconstructive
flourish on the auto-critical capacity of literary art. Instead, the Marxist tenor of Deleuze’s reading
of the island here indicates an early attempt by him to sketch out a materialist philosophy of
becoming which both seeks to establish a universally fluid and indistinct type of ontology, such
as is found in Agamben’s ‘bare life’; and, moreover, to articulate a theory of creative differentiation
and individuation which accounts for the emergence of actual material isolates―to geographical
islands, to species, and human individuals human individuals―without falling into idealism.
In his later major philosophical work, Difference and Repetition, Deleuze develops his
engagement with the relation between being as indistinction and fluidity (difference) and
individual, material (differenciated) beings (Deleuze, 1994; Del Lucchese, 2009). Deleuze argues
for a concept of the individual which is focused first on the process by which it is
generated―individuation―in order to avoid the presupposition that the individual form precedes
its creation. “The individual is neither a quality nor an extension,” Deleuze (1994, p. 323) writes,
as such a conception would rely on a transcendental understanding of differences and individuals
as opposed to the differential conception of materiality his philosophy espouses: instead, “qualities
and extensities, forms and matters, species and parts are not primary; they are imprisoned in
individuals as though in a crystal.” Here the individual is not the isolated, monadic human subject
or biological being, but a dynamic whole, “a crystal ball.” In this, qualities, extensities, or
individual beings and subjects are immanent, undergoing constant differentiation; any attempt at
the extraction of a single, sovereign, or final individual shatters its unity, and re-enacts of the
transcendental delusion Deleuze’s materialism seeks to repudiate.
The implications of this philosophical position are developed and clarified in Deleuze’s
commentary in Difference and Repetition on Darwin’s theory of evolution. Here, he argues that
Darwin’s innovation in biology was not its enhancement of biology’s accuracy, to the benefit of
classification, but the opposite. With natural selection, Darwin brought into the realm of biology
the notion of ‘individual difference’, understood in this instance as the irreducible individuality
of all beings within a univocal whole―as opposed to the mere surface differences between
individuals with which taxonomy concerned itself heretofore.
The great taxonomic units―genera, families, orders and classes―no longer provide a
means of understanding difference by relating it to such apparent conditions as
resemblances, identities, analogies and determined oppositions. On the contrary, these
taxonomic units are understood on the basis of such fundamental mechanisms of natural
selection as difference and the differenciation of difference. (Deleuze, 1994, p. 248)
Taxonomy after natural selection, therefore, becomes an ossified representation of a dynamic
and uncertain processual biological world. In ‘Desert Islands’, Deleuze anticipates this theoretical
position in geographical terms, arguing that the actual existence of material islands, like the
existence of individual organisms, is a negation of the idea that islands (and animals) represent
spaces of completion and closure, because we know they are constituted by material processes of
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differentiation. Islands are, by definition, never deserted―just as animals are never entirely
sovereign―because they are never ontologically separate from the rest of earth: a continental
island becomes disarticulated from a larger body of land; an oceanic island rises from geological
depths to break the water’s surface. These geo-oceanic dynamics tell us that the very conditions
which make islands possible also make their transcendent finality as well their desertedness through
radical separation impossible. The island, therefore, represents the biological flux in all its
monstrosity, embodied by Moreau’s ‘Beast-folk’ as opposed to Crusoe’s Puritanical capitalist
desert-island subject. However, where the isolation of Wells’ island is what stages the creation
of the subversive, biologically indistinct hybrid, Deleuze’s island is itself premised on the perpetual
play between material forces, which ensures that it can never be said that an island exists (being),
but only that it is relentlessly in the process of coming into and fading out of existence (becoming).
 Elizabeth Grosz’s (2011) reappraisal of Darwinian evolution in relation to the politics and
philosophies of sexual difference, Becoming Undone, develops this reading of Darwin’s evolutionary
thought through the prism of Henri Bergson as well as Deleuze. In this, she suggests that the deep
misunderstanding of the nature of individuals and thus islands Deleuze finds in Robinson Crusoe
also afflicts contemporary affirmations as well as critiques of Darwinism. Echoing Richter, Grosz
argues that after Darwin’s evolutionary thesis the human should be understood as an ontologically
uncertain object: an historical, differential, and durational entity which exists as both an individual
and a process of individuation, always in the course of emerging from the past and dissolving into
the future. Life, Grosz says, ‘[is] a kind of contained dynamism, a dynamism within a porous
boundary, that feeds from and returns to the chaos which surrounds it’ (Grosz, 2011, p. 27). Taking
up Deleuze’s analysis of Darwin in Difference and Repetition, Grosz argues for a concept of the
human in which it is understood that processes of differentiation and individuation are ontologically
primary, where forces of evolution precede and outlive organisms and individuals, and where the
individual is understood, like the island, to be a durational and contingent material entity.
 Grosz suggests that such an understanding of humanity through Darwin could represent
a powerful rebuke to biologically essentialist conceptions of sexuality and wider delusions of
human transcendence. In light of Deleuze’s reading of Robinson Crusoe, it would also by extension
address the conditions these fantasies provide for of a capitalist culture of destructive societal
individualism and atomization. However, such a conception of evolution and the differential nature
of human individuality and biological life is not generally shared by contemporary Darwinian
science. Stanley Shostak argues in his Evolution of Sameness and Difference that what he calls ‘ordinary
science’ (by which he means mainstream, institutional scientific practice) has largely become
concerned with mobilizing Darwinism for the naïve realist project of ordering the world and to
determine how human nature is governed primarily by biology. Shostak (1999, pp. 39-40) asserts
that, contrary to any properly radical conception of Darwinism which places at its heart the
immanence of difference, in ‘ordinary science’ difference is, more often than not, subjugated to
sameness, that is, as a series of resemblances, identities, or oppositions. In this way, life as a process
of difference is ignored in preference for life as an object defined by transcendentally anchored
differences. This allows a contradictory biocentric and anthropocentric Darwinism to flourish,
providing the ideological foundation for the usage of natural selection’s insights for purely
instrumental purposes: the protection of human interests, particularly through profit-making
biological commerce, and the collusion between those industries and the state in the interest of
biopower. Through Darwin, therefore, contemporary life sciences in alliance with capitalism finds
a way not just of repressing the processual, differential nature of life, but also to reaffirm humanity’s
central place as a sovereign: both within nature and capable of transcending it.
Steven Shaviro’s essay on ‘Interstitial Life’ suggests that it is precisely the radicalism of
Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection that causes the paradoxical return of a
transcendent concept of species. Darwinian evolution, Shaviro (2010, p. 132) argues, posits an
‘immanent, nonteleological mechanism for the development of life’, which in the absence of a
transcendent creator, assumes a form of organic self-creation. In other words, without an
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exogenous causal instigator, in the form of a transcendent creator (in whose divine image humanity
is itself made), a new form of self-activating or ‘autopoietic’ creative causality is required. It is in
part, therefore, the philosophical difficulty of re-thinking the very nature of causality, of
negotiating the idea of immanence and autopoiesis, which leads ordinary science towards a
renewed teleological and transcendental conception of the creation of life. In particular, the
“mainstream Neo-Darwinist synthesis,” which Shostak critiques for its close relationship with
capital, defends its explicitly teleological thinking as ‘an epistemological necessity’, re-entrenching
the primacy of representation over difference that Deleuzean and Darwinian conceptions of life
attempt to positively deconstruct (Shaviro, 2010, p. 141).
As a response, Grosz (2011) argues that it is vital the humanities move past its usual critiques
of biological essentialism, and reductionism, to engage with the Deleuzean conception of evolution
as a form of becoming. It is important, she argues, because without a positive project for
understanding biological indeterminacy coming from critical philosophy, the human sciences can
easily repudiate the humanities’ understanding of biology, while implicitly adhering to a fixed and
complete desert island ontology of the human against which its own most radical
concept―evolution―argues most forcefully. For Grosz, this is not merely necessary for the purpose
of rooting out philosophical or ideological contradiction. Hers is a politically engaged project,
which places a re-engagement with Darwin at the centre of feminist conception of difference.
The animal, Grosz (2011, p. 12) argues, is understood to be incapable of rationality, of reflection,
and, therefore, of ethics―and this distinction is extended metonymically to women, children,
slaves, and others, as “the alignment of the most abjected others with animals is almost ubiquitous.”
Feminist philosophies of difference, in particular, she says, are guilty of disregarding the value of
Darwin’s work by seeking to address its complicity in numerous intersections of forms of
oppression, while ignoring the assault it makes on humanity’s primary narcissism―its difference
from the animal. But because our self-ascribed humanity is both necessary to our being and sits
at the root of myriad forms of other oppression, critically engaging with these forms―and
Darwinism itself―demands a laceration of ourselves and the human as a concept.
This problem, Grosz notes, was anticipated by Derrida (2009, pp. 182-183) who in his late
series of seminars on The Beast and the Sovereign perceived that of all the blows to the human ego
in the history of ideas―from Copernicanism to Freudianism itself―Darwinism was the most
threatening to humanity’s sense of sovereignty. Derrida suggests that it is only the singular power
of human narcissism which reproduces the myth that humanity’s capacity to “efface its own trace,”
to repress its ancestral animality, or to judge as to the success of the effacement, is what distinguishes
‘man’ from its evolutionary forebears. This “subtle form of phallogocentrism,” Derrida (2009, p.
183) writes, reinstitutes the anthropocentric conception of human as a sovereign subject and is,
in part, a response to the ‘panic’ induced by Darwin’s theory of evolution. Anticipating Richter’s
argument that the monsters of Dr. Moreau represent the horror of humanity’s biological
indefiniteness, the animal, Derrida intimates, echoing Grosz, is held by humanity in a position of
absolute wretched otherness in order to reconstitute its own superiority. In this way, rather than
wholly reject Darwinism, so called ‘ordinary science’ can avow its scientificness and hail its
predictive power but disavow its assault on human transcendence, mobilizing instead the economic,
scientific, and epistemological prestige of Darwin’s name in order to further shore up a
Robinsonian sense of individual sovereignty.
In the following sections, I continue to examine the contradictions that flow from the
tension between Darwinism as a theory of becoming and the individualism it seems to nurture,
and how they coalesce around and are reflected in the literary topos of the island. My aim is to
show how my theoretical elaboration of the relationship between islands―both imaginary and
real―and the post-Darwinian imaginary allows us to uncover a genealogy of island narratives in
literature, to which questions of biological evolution, human sovereignty, and capitalist
individualism are central. Starting with Michel Houellebecq’s The Possibility of an Island (2007),
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and concluding with Samuel Butler’s Erewhon (1970 [1872]) and Aldous Huxley’s Island, I shall
demonstrate how in each of these texts the island represents the only hope for human autonomy
after Darwin, and is, simultaneously, also revealed to be a purely fantastical notion, driven by
narcissistic and economic individualism.
The Possibility of an Island: evolutionary utopianism and the individual
The tension between humanity’s desire to become a desert island, the individualism of capitalist
ideology, and their relation to Darwinian evolutionary thought is one of the subjects of Michel
Houellebecq’s (2007) recent novel, The Possibility of an Island. This science-fictional roman à thèse
tells the story―or stories―of three characters, Daniel1, Daniel24, and Daniel25, three iterations
of a notionally single consciousness. The latter two characters are cloned, genetically modified,
‘neo-human’ duplications of their originary identity, Daniel1, living in a distant future shattered
by total environmental and civilizational collapse. Daniel1’s narrative is an autobiographical account
of his career as a cynical and obscene comedian; details his disillusionment with and hatred of the
world; and depicts his resulting drift towards a techno-religious cult, the ‘Elohimites’, whose
research into genomics and human cloning makes biological immortality theoretically achievable.
The narratives of Daniel24 and, after his death, Daniel25, describe the lives of Daniel1’s clones
who seek to construct a transhistorical form of identity by reading Daniel1’s autobiographical
testimony, in response to which they compose their own future-oriented exegetical commentaries.
The novel continuously oscillates between the individual narratives and testimonies of Daniel1,
Daniel24, and Daniel25, each of which is implicated in the other, and in this way sets up a dialogic
configuration between times, between consciousnesses, and between texts, suggesting in its form
the dynamic tension of the Deleuzean island, an individual whose very being is premised on their
place in a larger network of relations. There are three islands and one; a mirror of the Catholic
conception of the trinity; each of which is independent at the same time as it is dependent on
the other for its existence.
John McCann (2010, p.174) notes how this novel’s intricate, theologically redolent form
is also structurally homologous to the double helix model of human DNA and that this structural
conceit echoes the central thematic focus of the novel, the utopian possibilities of evolutionary
biology and genomic technology. The ‘neohuman’ race is constituted by a scattered population
of former Elohimites, each of whom live in individual, hermetically sealed
compounds―architectural desert islands. These compounds protect them from the climatically
hostile external environment which is populated by hordes of wretched, violent non-genetically
modified humans―the remainders of their genetic and cultural past. The neo-humans do not
require food or water to nourish themselves; they have been genetically modified to derive
nutrition from minerals latent in the atmosphere and, thus, neither introject nor excrete any
physical matter. And they do not require sexual relations to reproduce; at the expiry of each
clone, a newly minted body is delivered to the compound from a centralized cloning centre, at
which point that iteration takes up the endeavour of reading and commenting upon the life stories
and commentaries of each of his predecessors, extending their shared consciousness(es) indefinitely.
So the body of the neo-human is a hybrid of Moreau’s forged Beast-folk and Defoe’s desert island
subject: a eugenically synthesized organism that employs the possibilities of evolutionary fluidity
to construct a bio-architectural embodiment of its opposite: total historical and evolutionary stasis.
The neo-human is an echo of the cell in which it lives, a repudiation of the system of textual
interchange upon which it subsists: a sealed, sovereign monad, excised from the biological world
in which it lives―and to which it no longer has any relation except in the form of negation.
A life defined by biological eremeticism is intended, therefore, as a techno-biological answer
to the problem posed by Darwinism: Richter’s ‘anthropocentric anxieties’, the horror of biological
uncertainty, the destruction of the human island. “Closing the brackets on becoming,” Daniel25
observes, “we are from now on in unlimited, indefinite stasis” (Houellebecq, 2007, p. 372). No
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longer subject to the vicissitudes of evolutionary change and, in turn, mortality, the neohuman
synthesizes anthropocentric transcendence, untroubled by the horrors of natural selection.
However, by contrast, neohuman existence, in its affective and social aspects, appears less as a
solution to the problem of evolution and more redolent of a kind of nihilistic withdrawal.
Daniel24 and Daniel25 live out their lives in quiet contemplation, socially isolated from other
neohumans (apart from periodical exchanges carried out in code), emptied of all forms of desire
and even nostalgia for desire itself. Deleuze’s reading of Robinson Crusoe predicts this tension,
indeed argues that withdrawal is precisely the point. Crusoe requires a desert island in order to
reconstitute Western bourgeois culture and thereby to reaffirm individualist capitalism’s
transcendent civilisational value. Similarly, in Houellebecq’s work, remoteness in the sense of
biological as well as social and affective withdrawal is the necessary corollary of a desire for human
perfection and stability premised on negating evolutionary change. Vincent, the eventual leader
of the Elohimite cult, postulates that escaping from Darwinian law will allow humans to flourish
in their highest, most creative form. “Man,” he argues, “had a large brain, disproportionate in
relation to the primitive demands arising from the struggle to survive, from the elementary quest
for food and sex”: neohumanity would allow each of them to become a true ‘individual’ without
having to “worry about his survival” or “to be constantly on his guard” (Houellebecq, 2007, p.
280). To transcend becoming, the neohuman must also excise itself from the social relations that
are inherent in evolution which, in the close interrelations of Darwin’s entangled bank, include
competition as well as sexual reproduction and, thus, desire.
For Fredric Jameson this type of withdrawal―in this case, from desire itself―springs from
a form of desire: the utopian impulse. Writing on the concept, practice, and textual production
of utopias, Jameson (2007, p. 4) elaborates upon the everyday, unconscious enactment of fantasies
of independence and identifies explicit utopian projects in literature and politics as being defined
by an absolute “commitment to closure (and thereby to totality).” Such an impulse, Jameson
argues, finds itself expressed in, and is symptomatic of, a less-well articulated, universal―but
ultimately banal―desire for individual purity. This can be seen, Jameson (2007, p. 6) says, in
“even the most subordinate and shamefaced products of everyday life […] aspirins, laxatives and
deodorants, organ transplants and plastic surgery, [which] all [harbour] promises of a transfigured
body.” This is Deleuze’s desert island thesis enacted in bodily and material form: the subject
scours its body of all discernible forms of relation to its environment, casting itself as a
transcendentally autonomous space in which to re-invent itself. Similarly, Houellebecq’s desert
island fantasy, his neo-humans, embody the convergence of the idea that humanity is incapable
of dealing with―indeed, is horrified by―its own uncertain, biological ontology and its
symptomatic positive response: the utopian impulse – seen also in Robinson Crusoe―to re-create
a new, perfected, atomized form of life.
What Houellebecq’s high-tech, genomic, state of utopian suspension seeks to achieve, then,
is a finalised form of biological flawlessness latent in the very idea of humanity’s individuality.
However, unlike Jameson’s cosmetics, what neo-humanity offers to negate is biological change
in its most foundational forms: evolutionary transformation via natural selection and death as well
as creative change through sexual desire and reproduction. More than that, neohumanity offers
an escape from life under the intersection of evolution and capitalism. Daniel1’s misery, his
misanthropy, as well as the widespread malaise that leads to the worldwide popularity of the
Elohimite cult and its espousal of consensual suicide, is a symptom of all forms of relation being
hegemonised by the brutal logic of a capitalist interpretation of Darwinian evolution. An increase
in deaths among the elderly in hot Summer weather is viewed as a “natural means of solving the
statistical problem of an increasingly aging population.” Teenage magazines seek to exploit the
“primitive mechanisms” of sexual desire, according to which sexual attraction is premised on an
individual’s capability to kill other beings (Houellebecq, 2007, p. 41). Thus, individual self-interest
takes precedence over social altruism; “the regulation of sexual relations on the model of the
so-called free market has resulted in [a] world of sexual consumers, as brutally uncaring as they
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are happy-go-lucky;” and awkwardly valueless members of society―the elderly in particular―are
brutally sidelined in favour of the young, who not only embody superior sexual value, but have
themselves internalized the competitiveness of the Darwinian paradigm which society has thrust
upon them (Best & Crowley, 2007, p. 205).
What Daniel1 and his peers in the Elohimite cult seek to negate through the creation of a
utopian desert island is the misery of this form of relation which, it is understood, can only be
conducted in terms of a social Darwinian logic of competition and individual self-interest. The
paradox of the neohuman utopia, then, is not merely that it seeks to escape the affective and
social consequences of capitalist atomization through an amplification of its individualism. It is
also that it seeks to achieve utopian isolation from Darwinian materialism through the
intensification of its dynamics of change―a development which they increase in speed through
the evolutionary technology and genomic engineering. In other words, to become a desert island,
the Elohimites do not simply covertly disavow the processes of individuation and differentiation
which bind them in evolutionary life to relating to others―either through biological and
economic competition or sexual relation. Instead, they seek to mobilise those forces, to intensify
them, and bring them to a conclusion that suits their desire for utopian transcendence: definitive
biological separation from the entanglement of evolutionary change; the finalised individual.
Erewhon and Island: Darwinian utopias of the 19th and 20th centuries
Houellebecq’s suggestion in The Impossibility of an Island that the utopian possibility of the finalised
biological individual is paradoxically within reach by accelerating the very evolutionary laws
which seem to make it impossible is a challenging one. Not only does it appear to question
Deleuze’s argument that the individual is an inherently ephemeral entity, but it also asks its readers
to consider their own complicity, through their own utopian desire, with a biological and
economic complex that leads to a dystopian state of affairs, in this novel and in our own world.
In this respect, Houellebecq’s novel is a distinctively contemporary one, using the singular
possibilities of genomic technology as well as the intensely competitive logic of neoliberal
capitalism to make its point. However, this novel echoes two earlier novels, from the 19th and
20th centuries, both of which place Darwinian evolution―and its implications for human society
and individuality―at the centre of literary philosophical investigations into the possibilities of
geographical and biological islands.
Samuel Butler’s (1970 [1872]) partly satirical novel, Erewhon, tells the story of an unnamed
protagonist who, in the process of seeking to discover and claim land in New Zealand with which
to enrich himself, stumbles upon an isolated, hermetic country which, at first glance, seems to
be characterised by utopian plenitude, serenity, and stability. Erewhon is surrounded on all sides
by a vertiginous mountain range which seals the country off from its external environment,
making it, in effect, an inland island. Further to this, this country actively polices its borders with
a set of grotesque, threatening statues, designed to ward off potential interlopers. It is an island
then―a utopian enclave―whose economic and social isolationism, its physically beautiful people,
Arcadian architecture, and quaint, pre-technological way of life seem to represent nothing other
than a reverse image of and rebuke to the competitive, capitalist, imperialist industrial
late-19th-century Britain from which the novel’s protagonist has travelled.
This image comes to be shattered. As our protagonist becomes au fait with the political,
social, and economic system of Erewhon, it becomes clear that, although their country is borne
of utopian isolation, its success as utopia is questionable. What our protagonist finds is a country
remarkably similar to the one from which he came: ruled by a venal elite, where illness is punished
as a criminal offence, financial corruption is treated with empathy, and where banks and finance
have taken the place of religious icons and faith. But it is also revealed that the pastoral nature of
this country is the consequence of a brutally repressive regime that has destroyed all machinery
and banned all forms of technological progress. So while Erewhon’s supposed negation of
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Victorian Britain turns out to be a kind of mirror image of the capitalist logic of the struggle to
survive with which the Victorian age in England is associated, it also seems like a direct repudiation
of the spirit of industry and technology which nurtured and is nurtured by capitalism.
The apparently paradoxical nature of Erewhon, however, derives from a coherent and
specifically utopian ideology which, as with Houellebecq’s neo-humanity, has its origins in a
desire for transcendent isolation and the scientific possibilities of Darwinian evolution. The
justification for the destruction and abolition of all forms of technological advance is put forward
in a text, quoted at length by the novel’s protagonist, entitled The Book of the Machines, adapted
by Butler (1914 [1863]) from an earlier essay entitled ‘Darwin Among the Machines’. In this
former text, Butler speculates upon the cataclysmic consequences of technological evolution,
were it to proceed in the same manner as biological evolution. Machinery, he argues, has an
evolutionary advantage over humanity because:
the machine is brisk and active, when the man is weary; it is clear-headed and collected,
when the man is stupid and dull; it needs no slumber, when man must sleep or drop;
ever at its post, ever ready for work, its alacrity never flags, its patience never gives in.
(Butler, 1970 [1872], p. 205)
However, Butler’s evolutionism was heterodox. Rather than dread death by the struggle
to survive, we should instead fear the integration of the human body into circuits of non-human
reproduction and, thus, the definitive loss of human sovereignty (on which the category of the
human is based) at the hands of technology. This differs from Houellebecq’s novel, in which the
competition of natural selection has become synonymous with a brutal form of sexual competition.
Instead, machines, Butler asserts, ‘will rule us with a rod of iron, but they will not eat us; they
will not only require our services in the reproduction and education for their young, but also in
waiting upon them as servants.’ The human, having become a subordinate organ in the assemblage
of the inhuman being, loses its status as human and thus its own utopian sense of purity. Like the
hermetic compounds in which the neo-humans of Houellebecq’s novel live, Erewhon’s border
policing, its attempt to remain undiscovered by other societies, is a geopolitical projection of this
Utopian impulse for autonomy, stability, and safety from change. And its destruction of machinery,
like the genetic modification of the neohumans, is itself an intervention in evolutionary
development―an intensification of corporeal individualism―through which the human attains
a state of evolutionary sovereignty.
Aldous Huxley’s novel Island (2005 [1962]) bisects the historical distance between
Houellebecq’s The Possibility of an Island and Butler’s Erewhon, constructing a genealogy of
imaginary post-Darwinian island utopias spanning the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries. In its opening
pages, the novel alludes to its genealogical predecessor metafictionally: the novel’s protagonist
who, like that of Erewhon, happens upon an isolated, hermetic island nation, urges his
interlocutor―and usto recall “’the beginning of Erewhon’” (Huxley, 2005 [1962], p. 22).
Subsequently, the novel unfolds a markedly similar narrative to that of Erewhon. The novel tells
the story of the discovery by a Western man from London who has designs on the colonial
exploitation of an isolated and strange utopian country whose customs appear antithetical to those
of his culture of origin. This country is called Pala, an island apparently somewhere near Indonesia
which appears, like Erewhon, to work as a negation of the ideologies, conditions, and values of
British, Darwinian capitalism.
Also like Erewhon, however, Pala’s utopian isolation is paradoxically indebted to Darwinian
thought. Pala claims to have created a successful politically autarchic, economically isolationist
polity that derives its stability and serenity to structures of social organisation based on an
application of Darwinian evolutionary theories, and the elevation of biological science to the
status of a religious creed. This “new wisdom,” they say, is “biological theory realized in living
practice, is Darwinism raised to the level of compassion and spiritual insight” (Huxley, 2005
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[1962], pp. 193-194). Practically, this translates into eugenic breeding controls for humans and
non-humans, enabling the genesis of “a child of superior quality” with selective reproductive
planning (Huxley, 2005 [1962], p. 183). It also negates the necessity for external economic and
political relations by genetically improving crops. These practices, combined with a faith in
‘rational’ Buddhism, allows the island and its inhabitants to remain biologically and politically
separate from the world, and from its aggressively expansionist industrial neighbour, the Polynesian
island of ‘Rendang’. Like Erewhon and Houellebecq’s neo-humans, the Palas’ utopian desire for
transcendent individuality, at the level of society at least, is made possible not through their
rejection of the biological materialism of Darwinism, but through harnessing its biological and
technological possibilities.
The impossibility of the desert island
What each of these novels seems to suggest is that, contra Grosz’s and Deleuze’s conception of
evolutionary becoming and of the biological individual as a processual object, the desert island is
not just a fantasy; it is a material, biological possibility. Moreover, these novels impress upon us
that the desert island’s conditions of possibility are constituted by humanity’s anti-evolutionary
fantasy of biological autonomy which co-exists with its development of evolutionary science and
technology. Even in the case of Erewhon, where, unlike Island and The Possibility of an Island,
autonomy is made possible by the destruction of technology rather than its development, the
impulse for biological sovereignty is primary. And it would also be a mistake to compare their
Ludditism with the rejection of technology in its totality, since like the neohuman they only
adopt technical artefacts, such as the statue sentinels that guard their borders, in order to shore
up their autarchic isolation.
I have left it to the conclusion of this essay, however, to examine how at the end of each
of these novels shows the collapse of these individual islands and, thus, how they return us to the
critique of transcendent individuality in Deleuze’s essay with which I began. For Pala, the end
of utopian autarchy ironically comes about as a result of their own failure to understand how the
Darwinian struggle to survive inspires the actions of the imperialist neighbouring country of
Rendang and, furthermore, how the naïve, pacifist Palanese understanding of Darwinian evolution
leaves them open to attack. The novel ends with tanks from Rendang arriving on the island, its
invasion having being partly facilitated by the Palanese heir to the throne whose betrayal of his
people, in a final irony, was inspired by the temptations of the very capitalist consumerism which
the Palanese island sought to escape. Imperialism, he argues, is not a deviation from the principles
of evolution, but the logical conclusion of the Darwinian revolution which Pala itself embraced
wholeheartedly. The conclusion of Erewhon is analogous. Having escaped to England from
Erewhon in a hot air balloon, the novel’s protagonist outlines his plans to return to the inland
island with a fleet of ships, with the intention of colonising the country and co-opting its
population for labour. He understands that, without any form of contemporary machinery or
technology, the Erewhonian utopia is particularly vulnerable to attack. In Houellebecq’s novel
it is the network of textual interchange that undermines Daniel25’s isolation: reading Daniel1’s
account of the simultaneous pain and joy of human relation leads him to leave his compound in
search of others like him. Here, the failure of the neohuman understanding of evolution is different
to that of Pala and Erewhon. Here it is assumed that the human can subsist at an affective level
as an individual, as a pure, rational, and isolated island, whose interests lie in being transcendent―as
opposed to being evolutionarily, materially contingent. It is this misprision of Darwin’s thesis,
the re-insertion of the human at its centre, which leads to the downfall of their biological utopia.
These three novels, as well as Wells’ The Island of Dr. Moreau, form a notable transhistorical
genealogy of literary island narratives engaged in questioning human autonomy, the implications
of capitalism, and the impact of Darwinism―each doing so by placing the theoretically monadic
figure of the island at their narrative centres. This emphasises the importance of the island as a
Island Studies Journal, 12(2), 2017, pp. 267-280
279
literary spatial topos and connects them, implicitly, with older island narratives engaged in similar
thematic explorations such as Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. This also suggests that Richter’s thesis on
the rupture to anthropocentrism made by Darwin in the middle of the 19th century adds a newly
biocentric valence to the more fundamentally existential problem of the island and human
autonomy. Most importantly, these novels draw upon the dialectical dynamism of the island to
pursue an irresolvable point. Each raises the possibility of an island, of a truly autarchic utopia,
of a transcendent human―acknowledges its draw, even suggests its viability―while ultimately
revealing it as fantastical. This is at once a troublingly pessimistic affirmation of Darwin’s
evolutionary thought, as well as, nevertheless, a heartening testimony to the persistence of utopian
hope in the face of total biological fatalism.
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